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Chia-yin Chang, Taipei / Taiwan, R.O.C.* 
 
On Two Paradigms of Legal Theory and Their Relationship 
 
Abstract: H. L. A. Hart thought that a theory of law can be purely descriptive and called his theory a 
“descriptive sociology”. One of his great contributions to modern legal theory is his emphasis on the 
internal  aspect  of  social  rules.  According  to  him,  a  theory  of  law  can  be  built  on  the  basis  of  the 
description of the participants’ view without sharing with it. This descriptivism is totally rejected by 
Dworkin,  who  propagates  a  theory  that  denies  a  sharp  separation  between  a  legal  theory  and  its 
implications for adjudication. For Dworkin, a legal theory is only possible as a theory with “the internal, 
participants’  point  of  view”.  Dworkin’s  position  implies  a  radicalization  of  legal  theory  that  will 
transform  the  statement  of  an  external  point  of  view  to  that  of  an  internal  one.  For  Dworkin,  the 
descriptivism bases on the sociological concept of law, which is an “imprecise criterial concept” and is 
“not  sufficiently  precise  to  yield  philosophically  interesting  essential  features.”Hart’s  position  is 
vulnerable because it takes an impure form of descriptivism that still draws a categorical distinction 
between fact and norm. This theoretical impurity results from the ambiguity of interpreting the internal 
aspect of rules. A strategy to rescue the Hart’s project is to radicalize his descriptivism with Luhmann's 
systems theory. Adapting the systems theoretical distinction between internal and external observation of 
law with all its implications for the explanation of the legal system and legal communications, Hart’s 
descriptivism finally attains its pure form, which is not only a distinctive paradigm of legal theory, but 
also possesses the potentialities to clarify its relationship to the legal theory based on the internal aspect 
of law. 
Keywords: Hart, Dworkin, Luhmann, legal theory, paradigm, descriptivism, interpretivism, system theory 
 
I. Preamble 
New approaches in the fields of legal theories emerged frequently after 1960. These approaches 
were  not  limited  to  theories  of  legal  doctrines  (juristische  Theorien),  nor  were  they  legal 
philosophy in a traditional sense. They focused on new questions and research fields and were 
named as legal theory (Rechtstheorie) as a result of a new demand.
1 The period from 1965 to 
1985 was called the renaissance of legal theory  (Die Renaissance der Rechtstheorie).
2 In this 
period,  besides  the  traditional  approaches  of  natural  law  and  legal  positivism,  many  new 
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approaches emerged such as legal rhetoric (Juristische Rethorik), legal hermeneutics, theory of 
legal  argumentation,  discursive  philosophy  of  law,  scientific  theory  of  law,  law  and  social 
science, systems theory, Marxist legal theory, political-legal theory, pure theory of law, legal 
logic and deontic logic, and legal informatics.
3 At the same time, a decades long debate (a debate 
between Hart and Dworkin) started as a prologue to the new jurisprudential focus in the English 
speaking world. Parallel to this debate, new schools of law also arose such as critical legal 
movements, law and economics, law and society, feminist ju risprudence, and post-structuralist 
jurisprudence.
4 What are distinguished from legal theory are theories of law (juristische Theorie) 
and theories of legal doctrines (rechtsdogmatische Theorie). Theories of legal doctrines are 
theories regarding the resolution of various legal problems in legal doctrines.
5 These theories 
come from either a need for legal education or for legal practice.
6 
Legal theory or legal philosophy? Legal theory and legal philosophy? Legal theory as legal 
philosophy? These questions can be seen as a reflective attitude of reflectivity on law. They 
signify discontent with the traditional legal philosophy and a need for a new type of theory. To 
capture the meanings of the newly emerged legal theories, there can be different strategies. They 
can be analyzed by means of conceptual analysis, the development of concepts, social -historical 
approach, or sociology of knowledge. However, this article does not adopt these approaches as its 
methodology. This article uses the concept of legal theory and legal philosophy interchangeably 
because both are concerned with the reflection of law. The problem stays the same. Facing the 
diversities of legal theory since 1960, and the failing communication and dialogues between 
theories, is it possible to deve lop a framework to account for these multiple phenomena? A 
comprehensive framework will probably be outdated in today’s age of functional differentiated 
society. But how about the predominate form of the current legal philosophy? 
 
II. The Debate between Descriptive and Normative Legal Theory 
During the past decades, the legal academia in Taiwan has had an ongoing interest in the dispute 
between Hart and Dworkin. Instead of introducing, analyzing, and evaluating arguments offered 
by both sides, this article focuses on a debate about the paradigm of legal theory. In 2001 Julie 
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Dickson, a legal philosopher at Oxford University, demonstrated the clearest picture concerning 
this debate in Evaluation and Legal Theory, which triggered serious subsequent debates about the 
methodology of legal philosophy. Of course, the following debates still benefited from those 
between Hart and Dworkin. Therefore, this article will briefly introduce the debate between Hart 
and Dworkin. 
In 1961, Hart asserted that the book, The Concept of Law, was a descriptive sociology.
7 He 
analyzed and  explained the crucial elements in the concept of law  by distinguishing law, 
coercion, and morality.
8  Based on a distinction between habits and rules, he argued that in 
addition to external points of view of law, law also encompassed an internal aspect.
9 Laws in the 
modern  state  are  a  union  of  primary  and  secondary  rules.
10  Hart  illustrated  this  basic 
characteristic in his theory again in the second edition of  The Concept of Law after the idea was 
criticized  by  Dworkin  by  means  of  the  distinction  between  rules  and  principles  and  his 
interpretative theory of law. He argued that in his descriptive jurisprudence, nothing was able to 
obstruct an external observer, a non-participant, from describing laws by way of the participant 
holding an internal point of view. Indeed a descriptive legal theorist has to understand what an 
internal point of view is and, then, be able to put himself in a position of a participant to some 
extent. However, it is unnecessary for him to accept the law he observes or to accept an internal 
point  of  view  held  by  participants.  Therefore  he  does  not  have  to  give  up  his  descriptive 
position.
11  Hart  insisted  that  even  though  an  understanding  and  description  of  participants’ 
internal  point  of  view  entails  moral  reasons  for  conforming  laws,  this  does  not  obstruct  a 
descriptive theorist from adopting a neutral standing position. A description of evaluation is still 
a description.
12 
A basic issue in Hart’s arguments is his distinction of an internal and an external aspect of 
law and his distinction between the internal and extremely external point of view. Is a descriptive 
position, which enables an observer to understand a participant’s internal aspect without sharing 
his internal point of view possible? This question seems to be a problem of methodology for 
descriptive jurisprudence. If contemporary analytical legal positivisms define themselves as a 
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kind of descriptive jurisprudence, a defense of this descriptive methodology is unavoidable. In 
fact,  besides  Hart’s  self-defense,  both  Josef  Raz  and  Neil  MacCormick  also  argued  for  this 
descriptive methodology. Raz called this methodology the point of view of the legal man or the 
legal point of view.
13 MacCormick called it a non-extreme external point of view or hermeneutic 
point of view.
14 
Dworkin cannot accept this middle position between an internal and an external point of 
view. In his early criticism, based on a distinction between a discursive method of sociology and 
a discursive method of social members, he had challenged Hart’s theory of social rule.
15 In Law’s 
Empire, he further advocated a theory based on the internal and participant’s point of view and 
treated this point of view as a key for understanding legal practice.
16 Recently, in  Justice in 
Robes, he argued that, based on four categories of the concept of law: doctrinal, sociological, 
taxonomic, and aspirational concept of law, the descriptive jurisprudence held by Hart and his 
followers adopted “the sociological concept of law at most.
17 According to Dworkin, this concept 
used by sociologists as a criteria concept is inaccurate and approximate. Therefore this concept of 
law is unable to be adopted as a concept in the legal philosophy.
18 Furthermore, he argued that 
Hart and his followers’ theories are not a descriptive theory at all but only a kind of conceptual 
analysis.
19  
Is this sociological concept of law unable to be used as a doctrinal concept as Dworkin 
pointed out? This question is also raised by Julie Dickson when she defends an i ndirectly 
evaluative legal theory. Furthermore, does Dworkin’s criticism of the sociological concept of law 
contain a potentiality of “a radicalization of interpretivism?
20 In other words, does Dworkin’s 
“interpretivism” eventually cancel the distinction between an internal and an external point of 
view even without explicitly insisting that a statement from an external point of view is still a 
statement  from  an  internal  point  of  view?  Does  this  kind  of  “interpretivism”  also  lead  to  a 
conclusion that all statements of legal propositions are statements from internal point of view? 
Will this “interpretivism” also cancel the boundary between legal philosophy and sociology of 
law when canceling the possibility of descriptive jurisprudence? From another perspective, it is 
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fair to ask another question: Is it possible to radicalize Hart’s descriptivism and “hermeneutic 
point of view” to achieve a true descriptive sociology by canceling the distinction between an 
extremely external point of view and external point of view? For sociology, it is impossible to 
study  laws  without  understanding  participant’s  point  of  view.  Law  is  part  of  society  and 
“understanding”, as Max Weber indicated, is an unavoidable topic in sociology. 
This  article  does  not  aim  at  describing  the  dispute  between  descriptive  and  normative 
jurisprudence, or at the dispute between indirectly evaluative and normative jurisprudence, but 
tries to investigate this dispute, which exists within the legal system, from the perspective of 
systems theory. 
 
III. Two Paradigms of Legal Theory: A Reinterpretation based on Systems theory 
1. Legal Theory as Self-Description and as External Description of Law 
As Luhmann puts it, legal theory deals with abstract problems such as “why do people have a 
duty to obey the law?” and, therefore, it takes a distance from evaluating an individual legal 
order. But discourses in legal theory imply a self-recognition of law, because legal theory usually 
does not challenge the following questions: whether or not laws need to be enforced, whether 
laws must be particularized in a specific case, and whether an interpretation on a specific text is 
better than other interpretations.
21 One problem is explaining the legal theory when theory itself 
is subjected to a legal system. And when anot her theoretical possibility exists, how can it be 
distinguished from a legal theory which implies a self-recognition of law? 
Constructing the subject of research is the function of theory. Therefore, different theories 
(disciplines)  determine  different  stu dy  subjects  for  themselves  and  they  are  unable  to 
communicate with each other even if law is targeted as their study subject. This disability of 
communications  is  obvious  when  focusing  on  the  relation  between  the  traditional  legal 
philosophy and sociology.
22 Systems theory transforms the question of what law is, the crucial 
question for legal theory, to the question of what the boundary of law is. It argues that the 
boundary of law is determined by its object. In other words, law itself decides its boundary  and 
decides whether something belongs to law or not. According to Luhmann, the main points of an 
explanation based on a systems theory of law can be briefly described in the following steps.  
First  of  all,  it  describes  how  something  can  produce  its  own  bou ndary  in  relation  to  its 
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environment. Secondarily, it adopts a theory of observer: a second order theory. This theory treats 
its study subject as  an observer and also as  an object, which is produced from  a distinction 
between system and environment. Thirdly, an epistemology of constructivism is based on the 
second order theory. Finally, an observation based on a distinction between jurisprudential and 
sociological observation of law. Sociology observes laws from the outside and jurisprudence 
from the inside. Both observations only follow their own logic of system to which they belong.
23 
Systems  theory’s  arguments  are  based  on  a  scientific  system  and  belong  to  a  scientific 
system of observing and describing law and to “sociology’s observation on law.”
24 At the same 
time, systems theory distinguishes jurisprudential theory of law (traditional legal philosophy) 
from  sociological  theory  of  law.  Systems  theory  attributes  sociological  theory  of  law  to  an 
external description (Fremdbeschreibung) of a legal system. Only when this theory describes a 
legal system as a system of self-observation, is it appropriate. A description of a legal system 
from an external and scientific perspective is based on the appropriateness of its object and this 
description  treats  a  legal  system  as  a  self-describing  and  theorizing  system.  Therefore,  a 
sociological description of law needs to take the legal theoretical reflections on basic questions in 
law, such as the concept of justice, into consideration.
25 
Systems theory attributes jurisprudential theory of law (traditional legal philosophy) to the 
self-description of the legal system.
26 A primary distinction in systems theory is the distinction 
between system and environment. Only after a specific reference of system is given, can the 
respective environment be known. After considering a system’s capacity of self-description, a 
distinction between self-description and external description of a legal system results. Originally, 
the use of the concept of legal theory may presuppose an integration of the two points of view 
(self-description and external description), but systems theory has to separate them again.
27 Legal 
theory needs to take a side. It is either an external description or a self -description of law, which 
enables it to claim a normative validity and belong to the legal system.
28 
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2. Legal Theory as a Reflective Theory within the Legal System 
Sociological theory of law benefits from external descriptions, which refrain it from following 
the  internal  norms  or  presupposing  something  which  is  taken  for  granted  in  a  legal  system. 
Although it can take another perspective than that of the legal system, sociology of law needs to 
take its object seriously. It has to describe its object in a way to allow understanding by lawyers. 
It must observe that its object itself is an object of self-observation and self-description.
29 
Jurisprudential  theory  of  law  is  developed  in  context  of  law’s  own  self-description.  It 
respects law as a legal system and accepts the corresponding “normative binding” from the law 
which it respects. This concept of legal theory applies to both legal theory of doctrines and the 
reflective theory on a legal system. Systems theory’s investigation of jurisprudential theory of 
law focuses on the reflective theory. A reflective theory is devoted to describing the unity of a 
legal system, the meaning of law, and its function which enable it to establish expectation
30. It 
illustrates the development of the eigenvalue (E igenwert) of justice and the meaning of an 
autonomous legal system.
31 Because a reflective theory never gives up the distinction between 
norm and fact and insists that a norm is unable to be inferred from a fact, and described as fact, 
this theory ultimately  subjects  itself  to  the  legal  system  and  remains  a  kind  of  law’s  self-
description. 
Systems theory distinguishes observation (Beobachtung) from description (Beschreibung). 
Self-observation (Selbstbeobachtung) is defined as an attribution of individual operations into a 
legal system’s structure and its operations. Communications of the legal system are described as 
either legal or illegal through law’s self-observation. Self-description means illustrations of the  
unity of a system within the system. More accurately speaking, self-description reflects the unity 
of a system within a system. In addition, self-description will end up with a text, a self-referential 
text. The function of self-description is to thematize a system where self-description operates. 
This is the meaning of reflection. Because self-descriptions in a process of reflection will reflect 
that  self-descriptions  themselves  also  belong  to  a  system  in  question,  an  acceptance  of 
characteristics attributed to a system must be implied in an operation of self-description. In other 
words, self-descriptions, like the other operations within the same system, respect restrictions 
which are imposed on it by a described system. For example, self-descriptions of the legal system 
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will not argue against the idea that it is meaningful and legitimate
 to distinguish legal from illegal 
behaviors
32 
Based on these external descriptions of self-descriptions mentioned above, it could be found 
that self-descriptions entail an internal binding: self -description must incorporate itself into a 
system which it aims to describe and this incorporation is possible only when self -description 
accepts and thematizes the binding owned by the respective system. For example, self-description 
will not dispute that a legal system has a uthority to distinguish legal and illegal and it will not 
dispute that people must agree a “valid” norm. It will not dispute that obedience to a norm is 
correct and act as a legal system requires. The function of expectation recognized by sociology is 
interpreted as a behavioral indication in a legal system. The distinction between norm and fact is 
marked from a normative perspective in a legal system. This distinction symbolizes a tautology: 
norm indicates what ought to be done. And even a statement of sociology of law, insisting the 
factuality of norm, can be criticized due to its ignorance of essential characteristics of norm.
33 In 
a nutshell, the function of self-description is to interpret the unity, function, and autonomy of the 
legal system and it igno res anything irrelevant to the law and does not pay attention to a 
justification for a decision.
34 
The starting point in self -description is that controversial communications will always be 
settled within the legal system. This point results from the function and codification of a system. 
In other words, there is always an answer (a decision) to every question in the legal system and 
the decision is always based on good reasons. Although one right answer is not necessarily 
presupposed for all questions, one  right answer needs to be assumed during communications.
35 
Different from the other (legal) communications, self -description can avoid making a decision 
and taking a side. While the other communications have to make a decision or justify a decision, 
self-description’s avoidance of taking a side throws a question back to itself: self-description 
needs to clarify what is implied when a system promises to have an answer for all questions 
relating to legality or illegality and when all operations in the legal system are forced to obey the 
rule of justifiability.
36 A self-description has to set up a boundary within the system where it 
makes descriptions so that this self-description can observe itself and others by going back and 
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forth across this boundary. During processing self-description, a system presupposes itself and 
accepts its presupposition. Forms of justification are changeable but a coercive decision never 
disappears.  Therefore  self-description  has  to  describe  a  system  to  which  it  belongs  in  the 
following way: Searching for a right answer is meaningfully. The function of self-description is 
to endow a system with meaning and to promote continuous communications within a system. A 
transformation of self-description is also accompanied by a changing status of a system and an 
evolution of structure. Therefore it is necessary to search for a new self-description to satisfy this 
function. 
 
IV. Radicalization of Hart’s Descriptivism and its consequence 
On the one hand, there is a question of whether Hart’s descriptivism can withstand attacks from 
Dworkin’s “interpretivism”. However, on the other hand, there is also a relevant question of 
whether Hart’s descriptivism is sufficiently radicalized or not. The insufficient radicalization can 
be found in Hart’s characterization of law as a social rule and his interpretation of the rule of 
recognition. 
For the idea of law as a social rule, there are two possibilities of interpreting the internal 
aspect of rules: cognitive dimension and willingness
37. It is a question of whether both elements 
are necessary for Hart’s “hermeneutic methodology”, or one of them is sufficient. In other words, 
can an observer take a detached position when he explains an internal aspect of rules, or must he 
take a committed position? Of course, it is fair to ask whether this is really an either/or question, 
or is it just a choice on theoretical character? 
For the idea of the rule of recognition, the rule of recognition indeed plays a crucial role in 
identifying other rules within the legal system and functions as a criterion of judging whether a 
rule belongs to a certain legal system. The rule of recognition deals with the validity of rules 
within the legal system. However, Hart said that the rule of recognition itself is neither valid nor 
invalid. What matters is whether the rule of recognition is accepted or not.
38 Hart looked at social 
practices of judges, public officials, and private individuals and emphasized the factual existence 
of the rule of recognition.
39 It is quite problematic that the rule of recognition escapes from being 
challenged of its validity. By distinguishing between internal statements and external statements, 
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Hart tries to resolve the question of the validity of the rule of recognition. He simply veils this 
question by using a distinction between validity and fact. 
Based  on  the  observation  of  systems  theory,  the  distinction  between  norm  and  fact  is 
essentially the distinction within a legal system. Any legal theory based on this distinction has 
subordinated  itself  to  a  legal  system.  However,  this  distinction  does  not  benefit  scientific 
discourses because a scientific system only deals with factual problems without differentiating 
norm from fact. Therefore for sociology and sociology of law, it is impossible to mark the subject 
of study by a distinction between fact and norm.
40 For systems theory, the concept of norm refers 
to no more than a specific form of an expectation of fact. An expectation either exists or does not 
exist. Even though an expectation ought to exist, this argument does not regress back to a level of 
normativity but merely back to a level of an expectation, an expectation of an normative 
expectation. A concept of validity is not a normative concept either . When a law is valid, it 
means that a law is marked as a valid law by using the concept of validity. If a law is not marked 
by using the concept of validity, this law is invalid. Therefore a law itself has no binding force 
(die bindende Gewalt). Law consists in communications and the structure of communications.
41 
With  regard  to  the  radicalization  of  descriptivism,  it  seems  like  that  both  Dworkin’s 
“interpretivism” and  Hart and his  followers’ version of legal  theory do not  abandon a basic 
position of internal aspect within a legal system, which insists the concept of norm as the basic 
concept in each theory. A norm means what ought to be done. It is to suppose that if Hart and his 
followers  cannot  give  up  a  distinction  between  fact  and  norm,  their  descriptivism  is  not 
radicalized enough to escape from the critics of Dworkin. This kind of descriptivism is unable to 
go  through  a  boundary,  set  by  a  legal  system  (Rechtssystem),  into  a  discourse  within  the 
scientific system (Wissenschaftssystem). The radicalization of descriptivism here refers to the 
abandonment of the distinction between norm and fact, to the treatment of laws and legal systems 
as phenomena of society, and to the description and observation of laws and legal systems from a 
purely factual view of point. Using the terminology of systems theory, this radicalization means a 
system  reference  switches  from  a  legal  system  to  a  scientific  system.  A  purpose  of  legal 
philosophy  and  legal  theory  is  devoted  to  their  applicability  by  a  legal  system  directly  or 
indirectly. But, instead of a legal system as an addressee, the addressee of sociology of law is a 
scientific system and, therefore, sociology of law avoids any implication involved in normative 
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meaning. All statements made by sociology of law refer to a factual level and all concepts applied 
by sociology of law mark truths that are able to be observed.
42  
To  radicalize  or  to  complete  Hart’s  descriptivism  means  crossing  the  boundary  of  the 
system.  At  the  same  time,  it  may  result  in  giving  up  the  function  of  legal  theory  as  self-
description of the legal system, in the terminology of systems theory. It is a crucial dilemma of 
the descriptivism that cannot be resolved. On the one hand, to defend itself against the criticism 
from Dworkin’s “interpretivism”, the descriptivism is forced to leave the legal system, to which it 
belongs. On the other hand, when the descriptivism crosses the boundary of the legal system, it 
will lose its original identity as jurisprudential legal theory and at the same time fail its original 
function as self-description that gives reasons to the operations of the legal system. 
When the descriptivism achieves its pure form by way of giving up the distinction between 
fact and norm and through its adopting systems theoretical insights, this kind of jurisprudential 
legal  theory  transforms  itself  into  a  sociological  legal  theory.  The  relationship  between  two 
paradigms of legal theory becomes the relationship between legal philosophy as self-description 
of  law  and  sociology  as  external  description.  As  sociology,  sociological  legal  theory  could 
observe the legal system and its operations inclusive of self-description from the standpoint of 
scientific system, without obeying what the legal system demands. Whether jurisprudential legal 
theory adopts these external descriptions or not, the legal system and its self-descriptions must 
make a decision for itself. The mutual “irritations” will not be excluded. 
 
V. Conclusion 
H. L. A. Hart thought that a theory of law can be purely descriptive and called his theory a 
“descriptive sociology”. One of his great contributions to modern legal theory is his emphasis on 
the internal aspect of social rules. According to him, a theory of law can be built on the basis of 
the description of the participants’ view without sharing with it. This descriptivism is totally 
rejected by Dworkin, who propagates a theory that denies a sharp separation between a legal 
theory and its implications for adjudication. For Dworkin, a legal theory is only possible as a 
theory with “the internal, participants’ point of view”. Dworkin’s position implies a radicalization 
of legal theory that will transform the statement of an external point of view to that of an internal 
one.  For  Dworkin,  the  descriptivism  bases  on  the  sociological  concept  of  law,  which  is  an 
“imprecise criterial concept” and  is “not sufficiently precise to yield philosophically interesting 
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essential features.”Hart’s position is vulnerable because it takes an impure form of descriptivism 
that still draws a categorical distinction between fact and norm. This theoretical impurity results 
from the ambiguity of interpreting the internal aspect of rules. A strategy to rescue the Hart’s 
project is to radicalize his descriptivism with Luhman’s systems theory. Adapting the systems 
theoretical distinction between internal and external observation of law with all its implications 
for the explanation of the legal system and legal communications, Hart’s descriptivism finally 
attains its pure form, which is not only a distinctive paradigm of legal theory, but also possesses 
the potentialities to clarify its relationship to the legal theory based on the internal aspect of law. 
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